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Weapons of Mass Victimization, Radioactive
Waste Shipments, and Environmental Laws
Policy Making and First Responders
JAMES DAVID BALLARD
California State University, Northridge
KRISTINE MULLENDORE
Grand Valley State University
Transnational and domestic terrorists may employ unconventional weapons of mass
destruction and/or mass contamination in their future operations against governments.
These asymmetrical tactics may include nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons
designed to produce panic and disruption in daily life. This article addresses several of the
myriad legal and practical issues relative to potential radiological weapons. Several sugges-
tions as to local-level policy are offered and discussed. Among these suggestions are the need
for local law enforcement and policy decision makers to formally recognize the potential use
of radiological weapons of mass contamination and the need to develop both protection
strategies for radioactive shipments that may be at risk from this form of crime and proactive
public intervention measures for when communities are faced with a terrorist attack on ship-
ments of nuclear waste.
Keywords: terrorism; first responders; radiological terrorism; NEPA; environmental laws
BACKDROP
Recently the political, cultural, and legal climate in the United States began to
focus considerable public policy attention and enormous public resources to the
potential use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by terrorists (Department
of Justice [DOJ], 1998; Hoffman, 1998; Lesser, Hoffman, Arquilla, Ronfeldt, &
Zanini, 1999; Nolan, 1999; Tucker, 2000). This systemic Federal agenda has
consequences for civic activities, public policy, and for the very political struc-
tures that stand to benefit from this increased awareness (Ballard, 1997; Ballard,
2000a; Boyer, 1998; Stern, 1999).
The effect of such agendas on public opinion and the policy process is not
unidirectional as some Federal agencies seem to believe but it can have an
equally profound effect on how the Federal-level structures of power operate.
766
AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST, Vol. 46 No. 6, February 2003 766-781
DOI: 10.1177/0002764202239173
© 2003 Sage Publications
 at GRAND VALLEY STATE UNIV LIB on June 11, 2013abs.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
This article will explore the dynamics of one such unintended policy conse-
quence and how this may impact other Federal agencies, local communities, and
first responder/law enforcement organizations in their efforts to counteract such
acts of aggression as experienced on September 11, 2001.
Ballard (2000a) suggests that contemporary terrorism fears are part of the
creation of a “moral panic” and one that is specifically directed at expanding
Federal power. A moral panic is generally understood as a distraction device
used by existing structures of power and designed to draw the attention away
from underlying political processes (Cohen, 1972; Pearson, 1983). One way to
analyze and counteract these deliberate and self-motivated political panics is to
focus on both the intended and alternative consequences of the policy that
derives from such processes. This article will specifically discuss some of the
alternative consequences of the current focus on WMD terrorism and how that
focus may produce long-term effects not easily recognized, and clearly not
intended, by the existing structures of power.
ENTER THE MORAL PANIC
In trying to identify the alternative effects of the moral panic process, this
article will focus on only one variety of WMD and how the introduction of such
panics into the public policy domain can interfere with the intended goals of
those policy makers who consciously or otherwise used this policy justification
technique. For example, activists opposed to the recently approved Yucca
Mountain geologic storage facility for highly radioactive waste materials used
the current political focus on terrorism to justify additional safeguards and secu-
rity for the shipments to this forthcoming facility (Ballard, 2002a, 2002b). These
types of alternative effects may not be desirable to those Federal agencies, such
as the Department of Energy (DOE), that are promoting the fight against terror-
ism because they provide administrative and jurisdictional challenges for these
same agencies trying to use the threat of terrorism as a justification for budget
and mission-widening activities. This budget and mission-widening concept
can be found in many agencies and their current approach to countering terror-
ism, including the threat and use of nuclear alternatives.
To help demonstrate the process described above, this article will focus on
preexisting safety issues surrounding the disposal and transportation of radioac-
tive waste by-products created by the generation of nuclear power and nuclear
weapons production. To understand this process, we should first examine how
the Yucca Mountain waste repository will intern vast amounts of high-level
radioactive wastes (HLRW) from weapons production activities and spent
nuclear fuel (SNF) from commercial reactors in conjunction with the trans-
portation effort necessary to move these materials from their safe and secure
generation facilities and to the forthcoming Yucca repository (Ballard, 1997;
Halstead & Ballard, 1997b).
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Many experts believe that, to date, the controlling agency behind the Yucca
project, the DOE, has failed to incorporate the potential use of HLRW and SNF
as potential radiological weapons of mass contamination into their analysis of
the environmental risks associated with this large-scale Federal program
(Halstead, Ballard, & Dilger, 2001a, 2001b). This lack of effort is despite the
DOE’s own use of terrorism as a justification for the shipment program and
despite the sustained rhetoric from many Federal agencies that are promoting
the fear of terrorism as a legitimate law enforcement and public policy issue
(Mahaley, 2001; Meserve, 2001).
DEBATE FRAMEWORK
Somewhere between the extremes of the “terrorism threat” perspective
offered by the military, regulatory, and Federal law enforcement agencies that are
demanding more power and resources to fight this threat, and the self-motivated
DOE attempts to brush the terrorism issue away relative to the Yucca radioactive
waste transportation effort and thus quell public fears of anything radioactive,
lies a minefield of public policy indecision and regulatory debate. In recent
years, expansionist-minded Federal agencies felt the need to advocate for addi-
tional resources in a post-cold-war political environment and have tacitly agreed
to collectively promote terrorism as the main threat to the political stability of
the world community. For example, these agencies have used their cooperative
expertise in the media to promote policies that will eventually gather unto them
additional power, prestige, and resources (Ballard, 2000a).
In an attempt to understand the conflict between the moral panic created by
certain Federal agencies and the need of other agencies to disregard the implica-
tions of said moral panic when making decisions on nuclear wastes that can be
used as mass contamination weapons, this article is divided into three distinct
sections: (a) background of nuclear WMDs; (b) details of the Yucca Mountain
project, including projected numbers of shipments and their impact on local and
state jurisdictions; and (c) existing legal and regulatory mechanisms designed to
protect the public from Federal actions potentially dangerous to citizens, local
communities, and the environment.
The conclusion of this article will rely on the proposals of Flacks (1988), who
noted that everyday life could become the seeds of alternative policy action. This
author’s work would suggest that local community leaders and state-level politi-
cians can collectively use their power to create a grassroots political agenda that
employs the existence of the WMD moral panic as the basis of an effective strat-
egy to counter the powerful political and economic forces behind the Yucca pro-
ject. This theory provides a method to counteract the latent transfer of risk from
both the owners of existing nuclear power facilities and the oversight agencies
that control the nuclear weapons facilities to an ill-informed and unsuspecting
law enforcement community, local governments, and the general public. In
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short, Flacks provides the theoretical framework for a counterhegemonic oppo-
sition movement to this unfunded, and/or underfunded, Federal mandate for
local communities and their first responder communities.
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
Federal law enforcement agencies, terrorism scholars, and casual observers
of contemporary political debates use the term WMD to categorize a number of
tactics and/or the actual devices that have the potential to inflict death and/or
injury on large numbers of people. These agencies, the military, and terrorism
scholars use the terms NBC (nuclear, biological, and chemical), CBW (chemical
and biological weapons), or CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, and
nuclear) to categorize these types of tactics and weapons (Rabkin, 2000; Roberts
& Moodie, 2000).
As this proliferation of terms suggests, the definitions of these types of weap-
ons differ from author to agency to observer. These customary definitions of
massively destructive and potentially socially harmful weapons are expanding
as singular and exceptional incidents transpire. For example, after the Oklahoma
City bombing, some agencies and scholars started to contemplate how large
explosive devices should be added to these tactical typologies. Despite these
deliberations, the general focus of both policy makers and scholars has been on
chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons and their potential use by terrorists.
This article uses the typology codified in the acronym CBRN because it
focuses attention to the fact that radiological weapons exist and should be recog-
nized in the DOE’s plans to move tens of thousands of highly radioactive ship-
ments across the country and to the Yucca facility. To reiterate, CBRN includes
chemical weapons, biological weapons, radiological weapons, and nuclear
devices. The last two of these categories, radiological and nuclear, are the most
salient for this discussion.
No matter the types of tactics and weapons included in any of the most com-
monly used typologies, one overriding characteristic has been overlooked: With
few exceptions, these weapons and tactics are better categorized as weapons of
mass victimization (Ballard, 2000b). They are generally designed to produce
mass extermination of human life as opposed to the mass destruction of prop-
erty. The exception to this rule includes the use of radioactive materials and
nuclear devices that could destroy, or render useless for thousands of years, the
land and fixtures located within a large geographic areas.
Popular culture has vividly portrayed the potential use of nuclear weapons by
criminals, crazies, and terrorists. Books, movies, and television shows have
helped reify the potential use of this tactic. This common theme in our popular
cultural by-products feeds and reinforces the moral panic that Federal agencies
promote. To uncover the Federal government’s dominance of the nuclear politi-
cal agenda, one needs look no further than the DOE, the Nuclear Regulatory
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Commission (NRC), and issue-specific subagencies such as the Nuclear Emer-
gency Search Team (NEST) to find an entrenched bureaucracy designed to pro-
tect our national interests and motivated to reduce public fears of a terrorist
attack using a thermonuclear device. It is just these types of agencies that the
public and the media look to for answers when expertise is needed (Ballard,
2002a).
Terrorism scholars note that the nuclear and radiological subcategories of
CBRN weapons potentially pose the most destructive threat and could have
long-term effects on a society (Ballard, 1997; Ballard, 2002a, 2002b; Halstead
& Ballard, 1997b). The potential manufacture or acquisition, and eventual use,
of thermonuclear nuclear devices are a remote possibility, but some observers
have started to speculate about the more probable use of radioactive materials as
a weapon of mass contamination (Ballard, 1997, 1999; Halstead & Ballard,
1997b). In particular, the question is, “Should public safety officials concern
themselves about the potential use of SNF and HLRW shipments as sources of
highly radioactive materials that could be used in a radiological dispersion
device?” The entrenched nuclear bureaucracy codified by the DOE and NRC
does not necessarily want to have this possibility considered because it calls into
question the priorities these agencies set and challenges their practices with
respect to nuclear waste and use of the services of local law enforcement agen-
cies (Ballard, 2002a, 2002b).
Any terrorist that is contemplating the use of a radiological device knows
they are not the same as a nuclear bomb because they cannot necessarily achieve
a thermonuclear reaction. Thus, this type of weapon will not have the capacity to
destroy everything in their immediate vicinity. That does not mean these materi-
als cannot deliver significant negative social, financial, and emergency manage-
ment impacts on a local community and/or on the nation.
A radiological device uses mechanical and/or explosive devices to disperse
highly radioactive materials over a geographic area and thus contaminate that
area for years, if not centuries (Ballard, 1999, 2002a, 2002b). In response to sug-
gestions that SNF and HLRW could be used as radiological weapons, the DOE
and affiliated agencies such as the Sandia National Laboratories have in the past
conducted studies that downplay the risk of such an attack and minimize the
potential catastrophic use of these materials by terrorists (e.g., Luna, Neuhauser,
& Vigil, 1999).
The issue of what America should do about the tens of thousands of tons of
highly radioactive nuclear waste places policy demands on the DOE and associ-
ated regulators such as the NRC. As noted in several places above, this demand
is useful to these agencies when they are seeking increased resources but not
when they result in the imposition of scrutiny and accountability on those activi-
ties they are charged with administering, such as the transportation effort neces-
sary to make the Yucca project a reality. These demands, additional regulations,
and other requirements not factored into such transportation planning that
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already exists are unwanted burdens and counterproductive to their everyday
self-promotion activities, general operations, and everyday functioning.
These types of unintended policy consequences may be one basis for the
DOE resistance to more formally recognizing the risk of terrorism attacks
against nuclear waste shipments. With respect to this contention, contemporary
debates primarily center on what must be done with the by-products of nuclear
power generation (SNF) and to a lesser extent around the production of weapons
by the nuclear military infrastructure (HLRW). For both materials, powerful
interest groups and stakeholders (power companies and the military respec-
tively) wish to avoid having their own activities come under public scrutiny and
wish to avoid the invocation of potential environmental-based regulatory con-
strictions associated with the risks of terrorism against nuclear waste shipments.
The motivation for state agencies such as the DOE then becomes one to bal-
ance the use of a moral panic to promote resource redistributions to certain Fed-
eral agencies and the simultaneous pressure from that same moral panic that
could cause increased regulation of their behavior. The current terrorism debates
as they relate to SNF and HLRW disposal discussed in the next section of this
article set the stage for the argument that the Yucca transportation plans are sub-
ject to unwanted regulatory and public scrutiny.
IMPACTS ON LOCAL JURISDICTIONS
The DOE has proposed by means of an environmental impact statement a
large-scale, and multiple-year, transportation program for the various highly
radioactive nuclear waste products needing disposal. This transportation effort
will be necessary to move tens of thousands of tons of radioactive waste to a cen-
tralized geologic repository in the Southern Nevada desert.
The scope and scale of this transportation effort is unprecedented in America
and one of the largest anywhere in the world (Halstead et al., 2001b). The DOE’s
Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS), part of the Environmental
Impact Statement (EIS) process, for this project included a proposed action that
would transport 70,000 metric tons of material (Department of Energy [DOE],
1999, p. A-1). The hundreds of thousands of pounds of highly radioactive mate-
rials these shipments represent must be shielded from the environment for
10,000 years because of their extensive radioactive inventories. These radioac-
tive materials come primarily from commercial reactors (63,000 metric tons
from 33 different states), DOE facilities (7,000 metric tons from 4 states), and
include surplus weapons-grade materials that have been reprocessed into mix-
oxide fuel and/or immobilized (50 metric tons). The Final Environmental
Impact Statement (FEIS) for the project offers significantly different numbers
but still suggests that it will take years to complete the tasks that the DOE seeks
to accomplish at the Yucca facility.
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Due to the elongated approval process for the facility and the protracted and
intense opposition from Nevada, the DOE has proposed, and as of now not dis-
counted, the final use of an interim facility until such time as a final geologic
repository could be sited (DOE, 2002). The use of this option would increase the
total number of radioactive shipments as they are loaded, unloaded, and
reloaded over the years and from facility to facility (Halstead & Ballard, 1997a).
In discussions on the permanent or interim options, Southern Nevada is the only
location being sited for use. No current plans exist for additional facilities, despite
the fact that more waste products exist than can legally or practically be interned
in the Yucca facility (DOE, 2002).
As part of the process of locating such a repository, the DOE was required to
prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS). One major step in this process
is the construction of a draft statement (DEIS) that defines the parameters of the
discussion. This document was presented for public comment in 1999 and the
final environmental impact statement (FEIS) was completed in February 2002.
Because the routes, testing updates, transportation vehicle configuration, and/or
the design of the shipping casks are unreported by the DOE in the DEIS or FEIS,
as are the actual shipment modalities and frequencies, estimates of the total
number of shipments range widely and seem to be based not on science but
rather on political motive. For example, one estimate shows a range from 56,600
to 104,500 (PIC, 1996, in Halstead & Ballard, 1997a). DOE representatives, on
the other hand, have reported that the actual number of shipments will be thou-
sands less than these numbers (Barrett, 2002). Likewise, the estimates of the
number of years such a massive transportation effort of highly radioactive car-
goes would take are equally as vague and range from 24 to 40 years.
At the middle range of predicted shipment activity, local communities in
more than 40 different states will be faced with an average of 3 to 6 shipments
per day that are leaving the current storage facilities and traveling on the inter-
state highways, railways, and waterways of America toward Nevada and the
Yucca facility. A cursory assessment of these numbers makes it sound like a de
minimis problem, after all it is just a few shipments a day, but when one remem-
bers that this level of activity will transpire every day, 365 days a year, and for at
least 24 years (maybe decades longer), with an average distance of 2,000 miles
and speeds that could be as low as 45 mph on flat surfaces, and that large num-
bers of highly radioactive waste cargoes will be on the road at any given time, the
enormous scope of the problem is becoming more discernible as the true scope
of the forthcoming transportation effort is uncovered.
The risk of a terrorist attack on nuclear waste shipments could be easily dis-
missed as someone else’s problem if it were not for the fact that these cargos will
be in such easily identifiable vehicles and traveling set routes with such a fre-
quency and duration that any potential saboteur or terrorist adversary would
have no problem planning an attack against these materials. Such an attack
would be designed to disperse radioactive materials around a community in a
classic radiological dispersion scenario. Once again, most of the materials being
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transported are not in danger of being used to make an atomic bomb, and they do
not have the potential to create a thermonuclear explosion. But as part of a radio-
logical device designed to disperse highly radioactive materials, the shipments
should be considered a potential, if not a primary, target for terrorists (Ballard,
2002a, 2002b).
Because the DOE does not recognize the full range of potential risks of ter-
rorist attacks on these shipments, they are currently not planning additional
security measures to protect the health and safety of the communities through
which these highly radioactive cargoes will be shipped. In fact, the NRC, a
major regulatory body behind the DOE shipment effort, has proposed a rule
change that reduces the security measures for these shipments (Halstead &
Ballard, 1997b). The existing regulations governing safety and security and the
impetus for even less security may be based on the perceived need to reduce
costs for this program, not on what is best for local communities, first respond-
ers, and national security. The DOE does not seem to want to self-regulate such
risks given the reality of the post–September 11, 2001, world. They specifically
do not recognize the need to protect such shipments from large groups of terror-
ists willing to commit mass suicide to achieve a goal (Ballard, 2002a, 2002b).
This self-serving “cost cutting” places the general public, local communities,
and state emergency management personnel in a difficult position. In short, the
issues for these public servants would be, What if something goes wrong with
transportation security, and what can be done thereafter to protect the lives and
health of local residents and the environment of their communities?
Nevada has led a sustained effort to see that the DOE complies with existing
Federal regulations and plans for the safe and secure transportation of these
highly radioactive materials. To date, these efforts have impacted the process
slightly but have not changed the fact that in a short amount of time shipments of
highly radioactive nuclear waste will begin to traverse highways, railways, and
waterways. Eventually, the number of shipments on the roads, moving by rail,
and floating across shipping lanes should reach into the thousands per year. Evi-
dence of this can be found in the DEIS and FEIS, and these documents lack a
clear focus on the concerns Nevada has already raised in its oversight of the
transportation process (State of Nevada, 2002).
Of interest, the DOE’s DEIS and FEIS identify the “parameters” of this
national-level transportation action and its potential impact on the environment
while failing to address the plan’s impact on states other than Nevada where sig-
nificant opposition to the siting of a repository has been long-standing and sus-
tained. These DOE documents leave unstudied the potential impact of the mas-
sive transportation effort necessary to move tons of highly radioactive waste
across 40+ other states. For example, some experts believe that the DEIS and
FEIS do not address the very real needs of local communities that face poten-
tial accidents or human-initiated events involving the trains and trucks trans-
porting these materials (Ballard, 2000a). Likewise, the DEIS and FEIS fail to
discuss the breakdowns by either of these transportation modalities or the
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admittedly more remote possibility and consequences of terrorist attacks against
these shipments.
The next section of this article will address the regulatory background (envi-
ronmental impacts) for major Federal actions such as the Yucca transportation
program and help determine if there exists a useful method for local communi-
ties to require the DOE and Federal government to address their needs prior to
this becoming an unfunded Federal mandate. This potential mandate may force
local and state governments to face the fiscal consequences of this Federal trans-
portation effort without the benefit of adequate Federal funds.
REGULATORY OBLIGATIONS
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) (1969, 2002) created a man-
date that required Federal agencies engaging in “legislation and other major
Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment” to
prepare an EIS before engaging in the proposed legislation or action (42 USC
4321). NEPA’s statement of purpose articulates a public policy agenda that
requires the Federal government to “fulfill the responsibilities of each genera-
tion as a trustee of the environment for succeeding generations” while assuring
all Americans “safe, healthful, productive, and esthetically and culturally pleas-
ing surroundings” that employ the environment in beneficial ways “without deg-
radation, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable and unintended conse-
quences” (emphasis added) (42 USC 4321[101][b]).
The DOE has failed to achieve the public policy mandate articulated in NEPA
by minimizing the administrative burden it imposes in preparing the Yucca
Mountain project EIS (either the DEIS or FEIS) by choosing to ignore the local
impacts of this massive transportation program and downplaying the potential
of terrorism as a risk factor against these types of cargoes. These are precisely
the type of unintended consequences that can degrade the environment that
NEPA was designed to address. In particular, the DOE fails to comply with the
regulatory purposes contained in NEPA that should govern their actions in its
failure to achieve the public policy goals expressed in NEPA.
For example, both the DEIS and FEIS for this project fail to address the
potential environmental impacts of this transportation program on each individ-
ual state involved or even attempt to aggregate groups of states with similar geo-
graphic and social compositions for such an analysis (DOE, 1999, 2002). The
DOE does not consider the site-specific effect of transporting nuclear waste on
states other than Nevada, collectively or individually. Neither the DEIS nor the
FEIS analyzes the effects of moving across these states as part of this previously
described massive effort to centralize the storage of these highly radioactive
materials at the temporary or permanent storage faculty.
Such omissions are a clear violation of the spirit of NEPA, as well as the
application of this policy agenda. Section 102(2)(A) and (B) of NEPA compels
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all Federal agencies to bring the environmental impact of any proposed action
into play as a “proper factor” in its final plans for a project by using a “systematic
and interdisciplinary approach” in planning each agency action. This is a “reor-
dering of priorities” in agency decisions ranking environmental concerns at a
high priority, but it is not a dictate that environmental concerns must always con-
trol the final plan (Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. U.S. Atomic
Energy Commission, 449 F.2d 1109, 1111 [DC Cir, 1971]). The EIS analyses for
a project such as that set forth in the Yucca plans are intended to ensure that these
environmental costs are properly considered. In the EIS, a “detailed statement”
of the impact of the proposed action on the environment, factoring costs and
describing alternative approaches, must be provided and alternative plans that
would impact less significantly on the environment also must be considered (Id
at 1114). NEPA is broad in scope, “compelling consideration of any and all types
of environmental impact of Federal action” (Id. at 1122). The EIS mandates that
agencies planning such actions engage in a case-by-case balancing act and that
balancing is to take into account the benefits of a proposal within the context of
the environmental costs (Id. at 1123).
As noted earlier, under 42 USC 4332(2)(C), Federal agencies are required to
file an EIS with “every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation
and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment.” The courts have interpreted this requirement to mean that agen-
cies must take a “hard look” at environmental impacts and that hard look is to
include considering the cumulative effect of individual projects that are pro-
posed (Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 US 390, 410 [1976]). This collective consid-
eration of the cumulative effects of individual acts or plans prevents a Federal
agency from engaging in what is commonly referred to as “segmentation.”
Under segmentation, an agency divides a project into many smaller units, thus
resulting in the creation of smaller units, each of which have an apparently insig-
nificant impact on the environment, where the sum of their total impact would
not be found to be insignificant.
Council of Environmental Quality (CEQ) regulations prevent this segmenta-
tion of projects by specifically requiring that individual actions that are part of
proposed agency plans that have similar characteristics, including such things as
common geographic features or common timing, be reviewed for their cumula-
tive impact (40 CFR 1508.25 [a][3] and 1508.27 [b][7]; Natural Resources
Defense Council v. Hodel, 865 F.2d 288 [DC Cir, 1988]). This policy and regula-
tory mandate of program-level assessment helps ensure that the goals of NEPA
are achieved.
In addition to Federal agencies masking the “cumulative effect” by creat-
ing smaller plans with impacts that are undetectable when analyzed sepa-
rately, improper segmentation is also found where (a) a proposed action has
“little or no independent utility and its completion may force the larger pro-
ject to go forward whatever the environmental impacts” and where (b) it would
be “unwise to undertake the first phase if subsequent phases were also not taken”
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(Hirt v. Richardson, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19403 [WD Mich, 1999]; 40 C.F.R.
1508.25 [a][1]).
It is important also to recognize the inverse effect that a program-level, as
opposed to site-specific, EIS can have if it operates to hide a project’s risks to the
environment by obscuring significant site-specific concerns. If governmental
activities are grouped together because of some common link created by com-
mon geographic characteristics or sequential timing, the grouping may then
conceal the unique characteristics and risks to the environment that will be pres-
ent at only particular points or places in the proposal. In short, these environ-
mental impacts are diminished, or diluted, by being made part of a large-scale
project. They appear to be less severe because they are spread out over greater
amounts of time or larger geographic areas. In other words, “objects are larger
than they appear in the mirror.”
The U.S. Supreme Court implicitly recognized this possibility in Baltimore
Gas & Electric Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 462 U.S. 87 (1983).
In this case, the Supreme Court decided a case about how the NRC determined
that boards engaging in the licensing of nuclear power plants could assume that
permanent storage of certain nuclear wastes would have no significant impact
on the environment and would not be a factor in deciding whether to issue a par-
ticular license. In making this determination, the Court stated that a
key requirement of NEPA, however, is that the agency consider and disclose the
actual environmental effects in a manner that will ensure the overall process,
including both the generic rulemaking and the individual proceedings, brings
those effects to bear on decisions to take particular actions that significantly
impact the environment. (p. 96)
Although the Court found in that case that there had been a sufficient study of
particular concerns, it noted that “an agency must allow all significant environ-
mental risks to be factored into the decision whether to take the proposed action”
(emphasis added) (p. 99).
Where a project has more particularized impacts, both program and site-
specific EIS reports are required by the terms of NEPA. Thus, the question is left
open for each Federal agency that prepares a proposal. This question is whether
the program has site-specific impacts significant enough to require a site-
specific EIS in addition to the program-level EIS and whether the programmatic
assessment sufficiently addresses the proper local concerns.
In the case of the Yucca project, a dual level of EIS analysis (both site specific
and programmatic level) should have been conducted. This would mean that the
published project-level FEIS is deficient and should, at a minimum, be supple-
mented by a series of site-specific impact statements for each state, or state
group, that has sufficiently common site characteristics.
Engaging in such a dual level of EIS analysis would not only satisfy the dic-
tates and public policies of NEPA but would address an underlying and funda-
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mental problem that has been a recurring theme in SNF disposal plans, the invo-
cation of territorial protective instincts as a natural consequence of the moral
panic created by those who are the agency decision makers behind these plans.
For example, the pressure to site this storage facility in Nevada has continuously
increased. According to the terms of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) of
1982, January 31, 1998, was the date by which the Federal government was to
have begun accepting commercial SNF, a date at the time of this writing that has
been passed by more than 3 1/2 years.
The pressures on politicians and the agencies involved are intense. The reac-
tion of the state of Nevada, once it was designated as the only site to be consid-
ered, was to turn to the courts and present a variety of challenges to the process
and decision (Mullett, 2001; Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act, 1987;
Ross, 2002). Governmental policies and attempts to resolve the seemingly insol-
uble problem of what to do with the increasing amount of SNF have thus taken
on an extremely adversarial posture, and court actions will become necessary to
solve these dilemmas.
Gerrard (1997) explores this underlying problem when identifying that
“fear” is created when “outsiders” are engaged in sending their “trash into your
territory” (p. 1018). To date, these fearful reactions have not been given much
deference in the law; in fact, the predominant needs of the nation have been
found to override these local concerns under the Congressional commerce
clause powers (City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 [1978]).
Many observers believe that the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, may
operate to increase the importance of these concerns. As one commentator
noted, “It is obvious to even the most casual observer that the current accumula-
tion of waste is infinitely more secure on-site than it would be during transport”
(Adams, 2002, p. 10). As noted by the Ninth Circuit in its decision in No Gwen
Alliance v. Aldridge (1988), there is no “national defense” exemption to NEPA.
Security concerns regarding information in an EIS may require nondisclosure
due to national security reasons but the requirements of NEPA must still be met
(Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii, 1981).
Whether their legal relevance remains undecided, types of fearful reactions
will still have significant impact on the level of societal acceptance of agency
choices. The impact of this “territorial protection” reaction in connection with
the Yucca project will impact the local and state-level concerns for transporta-
tion corridor jurisdictions. These impacts may conflict with the desires of Fed-
eral agencies and policy makers to underrepresent by selective study the poten-
tials for environmental impacts. To date, the DOE has not shown any interest in
doing comprehensive programmatic and/or site-specific EIS analysis because
the agency does not recognize the risks these shipments pose to the multitude of
jurisdictions the shipments will traverse or its managers do not feel a need to
address the local concerns they will create. In particular, the DEIS and FEIS do
not address these issues, and currently there is no indication that the DOE will
reformulate the FEIS to address these concerns unless significant local legal
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opposition based on NEPA requirements results in court decisions mandating
this type of policy adjustment.
CONCLUSIONS
The deliberate and self-motivated DOE actions regarding the Yucca project
are designed to downplay the risk of terrorism and other transportation risk fac-
tors. This dissociation from the facts is important because the potential negative
outcomes of such decisions are profound for local and state police, firefighters,
and public safety officials. These are the same public officials who will be asked
to respond to an accident involving the shipments of highly radioactive waste, to
counteract an act of sabotage against these same shipments, and/or to deal with
the outcomes of a full-on terrorist attack against the radioactive cargo.
Without proper programmatic and site-specific environmental analysis of the
Yucca transportation effort, local and state agencies may be asked to respond to
these highly dangerous environmental hazards without benefit of preincident
awareness, training, and information. This is one area where the DOE’s current
policy can be challenged and specifically based on the improper analysis of such
risks under the NEPA requirements.
Security experts recognize that the essential first step in providing safe and
secure transportation for any cargo is the recognition of potential threats to those
shipments. Therefore, the first recommendation for public officials in those Fed-
eral agencies associated with this project is to follow the dictates and public pol-
icy of NEPA and conduct a proper, complete, and comprehensive environmental
assessment that does not improperly aggregate the risks and impacts of this pro-
ject. Specifically, the DOE should withdraw the existing FEIS as viable docu-
mentation of the process and reformulate the analysis to include site-specific
analysis for each of the other 40+ states impacted by this major Federal action.
In addition, to increase the protection of these shipments from potential risks
associated with terrorism, the NRC should publicly state exactly what security
regulations would be in place for the Yucca project and thus allow local and state
governments to make their plans accordingly. Although some protection strate-
gies have been offered, the NRC has yet to formalize their plans for these ship-
ments and some concern has been expressed about this regulatory organization’s
willingness to accept this burden given the DOE’s planning and management of
this project (Halstead & Ballard, 1997b). In conjunction with specific clarifica-
tion of security measures, the DOE should incorporate site-specific plans for
training personnel, specific methodologies for the reimbursement of costs asso-
ciated with training in transit emergency responder communities, and planning
for both costs and logistics needed to provide equipment and funding to these
stakeholders.
These items must be part of the EIS for the Yucca project. Such planning and
preparation of the hundreds of thousands of first responders and their respective
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emergency incident managers from across the country are not included in the
current analysis. Such planning and preparation is essential for them to effec-
tively handle any difficulties, environmental, social, and financial, that may
occur. These agencies need to be prepared for the potential of an accident, an act
of sabotage, a terrorist attack, and/or any other human-initiated event involving
these shipments.
In the absence of proper Federal agency action to protect the environment
from accidental or deliberate radiological contamination, local and state govern-
ments should initiate legal action against the DOE to force its compliance with
the dictates of NEPA. In particular, they should file complaints based on the
improper aggregation of local risks and how the planning codified in the DEIS
and/or FEIS does not address the needs and concerns of their communities.
These conclusions demonstrate how recent calls for the need to mobilize the
nation’s law enforcement and defense resources to counteract terrorism can seri-
ously impact other Federal agencies in unplanned ways. In the case of the Yucca
project, these consequences include the need to formally recognize that terror-
ism is a risk factor in the transportation of highly radioactive cargoes as well as
the need to formally consider these risk factors in the DEIS and FEIS for this
project. The DOE shows reluctance to admit to these risks because they point out
the serious shortcomings in their DEIS and FEIS development efforts.
Local and state governments who start to recognize the impacts of these
actions as shipments begin to traverse their jurisdictions can hasten this recogni-
tion by the DOE if they legally challenge this agency to disaggregate the analysis
of the Yucca Mountain project and formally analyze the site-specific impacts of
this project on local and state governments affected by this proposed large-scale
Federal action. As suggested by Flacks’s theory, these local jurisdictions can use
the existing policy formation process codified in NEPA to effect change in the
DOE plans. This then would represent a policy change that would be from the
grassroots upward, not from the Federal government downward.
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